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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to model a liberal profession, in this case physicians.
We propose a model in which the physician acts in the same way as an agent who
maximises his utility function subject to his budget constraint, while at the same
time being able to a¤ect his rate of remuneration. This model presupposes that
physicians attempt to reach two target, namely income and leisure, and that
the trade-o¤ between these two target depends on their monopolistic power.
Unlike existing models, our proposed model advances that some physicians may
have a disutility for leisure and may adopt altruistic or strategic behaviours.
To determine the relevance of our model, we estimate salaried, rm and agent
versions of the model based on a sample of 317 physicians practicing in the
Provence-Alpes-Côte dAzur region (PACA). We observe that physicians do not
act like a purely prot-maximising rm. Furthermore, they are able to a¤ect
their net remuneration rate through their labour supply. The model that we
propose therefore is of particular importance. We estimate that around 20%
of physicians experience disutility from leisure, which can be explained by their
adoption of altruistic and strategic behaviours.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to model a liberal profession, in this case physicians. The litera-
ture typically considers physicians in the same way as rms or self-employed individuals
who supply labour and whose objectives are, for example, leisure and consumption [1].
Several authors have since integrated other elements into the physician model, such as
altruism, patient welfare, and patient economic well-being[1]. However, these models
cannot be applied to French family physicians. Salaried models presuppose that the
1
physician is a worker who cannot a¤ect the price of his labour. However, in France,
physicians are able to choose the number of patients they wish to receive on an hourly
basis. Moreover, the standard models assume that physicians act as prot-maximising
rms with no regard for possible additional elements in physiciansobjective functions.
To model the activity of French physicians, we therefore propose a model in which
the physician acts in the same way as an agent who maximises his utility function
subject to his budget constraint, while at the same time being able to a¤ect his rate
of remuneration. This model presupposes that physicians attempt to reach two target,
namely income and leisure, and that the trade-o¤ between these two target depends
on their monopolistic power.
Unlike existing models, our proposed model advances that some physicians may
have a disutility for leisure and may adopt altruistic or strategic behaviours.
To determine the relevance of our model, we estimate salaried, rm and agent
versions of the model based on a sample of 317 physicians practicing in the Provence-
Alpes-Côte dAzur region (PACA). We observe that physicians do not act like a purely
prot-maximising rm. Furthermore, they are able to a¤ect their net remuneration
rate through their labour supply. The model that we propose therefore is of particular
importance. We estimate that around 20% of physicians experience disutility from
leisure, which can be explained by their adoption of altruistic and strategic behaviours.
2 Classical microeconomic models
2.1 Physician as price-taker salaried
In this model, we assume that a physician is a salaried individual who accepts to work
according to an hourly net remuneration rate w. The physician therefore maximises
his utility function U(L;C) subject to the following budget constraint:8>>>><>>>>:
Max U(L;C) = CL'
UC : wh+M = PC
h = 8640  L
w = number of actsact price expenses taxes
h
where L represents leisure, h , labour supply, C , the consumptions, M others
income and P the price of consumption. 8640 is the time endowment of a physician
over one year. In this model, we assume that the net remuneration rate is exogenous.
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When the physician optimises his utility function, the ratio between the two expo-
nents of the Cobb-Douglas function is:

'
=
1
L

(8640  L) + M
w

(1)
The ratio between the exponents of the Cobb-Douglas function allows us to deter-
mine the preferences of the agent for the leisure good, L or for the consumption good,
C. If the ratio is greater than 1, then the agent has a preference for consumption good,
while a ratio of less than 1 indicates a preference for leisure good. This model also
allows us to determine substitution and income e¤ects.
However, this model cannot be applied to a liberal profession. The behaviour of lib-
eral professionals cannot be modelled as a function of an exogenously set remuneration
rate, as their work e¤ort itself may inuence their remuneration.
If a physician observes a reduction in their per-patient remuneration, he can decide
to examine more patients per hour and thus compensate for this reduction in payment
per patient. Given that physicians can e¤ectively determine the price of their leisure,
we decided to treat the physician as if they were prot-maximising rms. Two cases
may arise. In the rst, physicians are unable to a¤ect their hourly rate of remuneration.
In the second, they can partly inuence their remuneration rate.
2.2 Physician is a rm
Several cases can be presented according to the inuence which physicians can exert
on market prices. In the rst case, we present a model where physicians exercise their
profession in a perfectly competitive market. In the second and third cases, we set out
models in which physicians have some monopolistic power.
2.3 Physician is a rm in a pur and perfect market (rm as
price-taker)
Here we assume that the physician acts like a rm and maximises his prot function
 : (
 = hW   Expenses  h T (h;W; household size)
W = number of actsact price
h
where h is the labour supply, W is the hourly remuneration rate (hourly fees in the
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case of physicians) and T (h;W; household size) is the marginal taxe rate according
to labour supply, hourly fees, expenses and the number of members in the physicians
household.
According to classical microeconomic theory, a rm maximises its prot when its
marginal cost is equal to its marginal benet. In our case, marginal benet and cost
are given by:
MB =
@Benefit
@h
= W
MC =
@Cost
@h
= T (h;W; expenses; household size)
As expenses are xed costs (rental or purchase of surgery and equipment etc.), the
marginal cost then merely becomes a function of taxe rate. A physician who maximises
his prot observes:
W = T (h;W; expenses; household size) (2)
In France, physicians have some monopolistic power, because they can a¤ect their
hourly remuneration rate, W . We therefore shall now consider the monopolistic power
of physicians.
2.3.1 Physician as a rm in a monopolistic market (rm as price-maker)
Fixed costs
In this model, we assume that labour supply can a¤ect the remuneration rate.
Thus, the prot function  becomes:(
 = hW   Expenses  h T (h;W; expenses; household size)
W = + h+ X + u
where W is a function of labour supply h and physician characteristics X.
The marginal benet is now:
MB =
@Benefit
@h
= + 2h+ X + u
The di¤erence with the previous marginal benet is h.
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The marginal cost remains una¤ected. Thus, the physician maximises his prot
when:
+ 2h+ X + u =T (h;W; expenses; household size) (3)
W + h =T (h;W; expenses; household size) (4)
The marginal benet depends of hourly remuneration rate and also of labour sup-
ply inuence on the hourly remuneration rate h. h is a measure of the physician
monopoly power.
Variable costs
In this model, the physician can a¤ect the price of his expenses. The optimisation
problem becomes:8><>:
 = hW   h c  h T (h;W; expenses; household size)
W = + h+ X + u
c =  + h+ X + v
where c is the hourly cost that can be written as:
c =
Expenses
h
We assume that the physician can a¤ect the price of his expenses for several reasons.
First, he can decide to employ a secretary; the expenses levels explained by the services
provided by the secretary therefore are dependent on the physician supplying his labour
for these tasks or not. Second, he can determine the quantity of labour that he wants
to supply. A physician who decides to increase his labour supply for a given level of
expenses can increase or reduce the e¤ective price of his expenses, c.
The marginal cost is thus a¤ected by the labour supply:
Cm =
@Expenses
@h
+
@Taxes
@h
= +2h+X + v+T (h;W; expenses; household size)
At equilibrium, the physician observes:
+ 2h+ X + u = + 2h+ X + v + T (h;W; expenses; household size) (5)
W + h =c+ h+ T (h;W; expenses; household size) (6)
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Marginal benet and cost di¤er when we assume that physicians can a¤ect the price
of their expenses. Consequently, it becomes important to determine whether physicians
can have an impact on market prices.
Monopolistic power of physicians:
A rm which has monopolistic power maximizes its prot as a function of demand
elasticity,  :
MB =MC = price

1  1jDj

(7)
Hence, at the rms optimum marginal cost equals marginal benet. The breakdown
of the hourly remuneration rate allows us to determine the elasticity of demand:
MB = + 2h+ X + u = W + h
When we replace the above equation in equation (7), we arrive at:
W + h = W

1  1jDj

Therefore, the elasticity of demand D is:
D =  W
h
(8)
According to this expression, increased labour supply reduces the physicians monop-
olistic power.
These models do not include the physicians utility function, hence our proposal to
develop a model in which the physician is treated as an agent who maximises his utility
subject to his budget constraint, while still being able to a¤ect his hourly remuneration
rate.
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3 Agent model with two objectives and monopolis-
tic power
In this model, the physician maximises his utility U(C;L) subject to his budget con-
straint, while still being able to a¤ect his hourly remuneration rate:8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
Max U(C;L) = CL'
SC : wh+M = PC
w = f(h) = + h+ X + u
w = number of actsact price expenses taxes
h
h = 8640  L
L  Lmin
We assume that the hourly remuneration rate is a function of labour supply h and
physician characteristics X. One part of the hourly remuneration rate is determined
by the market (,;  and u) while the other part is determined by the physician h:We
also assume that the physicians objective function features leisure, and that he wants
consume a quantity of leisure in excess of Lmin:
A particular case can be deduced from this model. When  = 0, the physician is in
e¤ect a salaried worker because he cannot a¤ect his hourly remuneration rate through
his labour supply.
3.1 Several cases can be observed depending on the sign of 
and 
This model allows us to distinguish several cases according to the sign of  and : If
 < 0 and  > 0, the hourly remuneration rate increases with the labour supply while
the budget constraint rst decreases and then increases in L:
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This would be the case if the physician realised economies of scale (labour supply
that increases productivity), but it appears an improbable scenario. Nevertheless, if
this case were to occur, then the optimisation problem would result in a corner solution.
If  > 0 and  > 0, then the hourly remuneration rate would increase with the
labour supply, and the budget constraint would be convex and decreasing:
As in the previous case, this is an improbable scenario. Here too, the optimisation
problem would result in a corner solution.
3.2 Special case: Decrease in the hourly remuneration rate
If  > 0 and  < 0, then the hourly remuneration rate would decrease with the labour
supply. The physician has monopolistic power and can a¤ect the price of his leisure:
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The negative slope of the hourly remuneration rate can be explained by two factors.
The rst is the reduction of the physicians productivity. The second is the loss of the
physicians monopolistic power. In e¤ect, increasing the supply of labour may lead
to patients requesting longer visiting times and thus a reduction in the hourly remu-
neration rate. In other words, a physician who examines a given number of patients
from 9am to 1pm will observe an hourly remuneration rate greater than a physician
who examines the same number of patients from 9am to 6pm. When this physician
supplies more labour, he reduces the monopolistic power he can exert on the market.
This scenario would appear the most probable.
The budget constraint therefore increases initially, but decreases once it has crossed
a certain threshold.
When the physician consumes LF , then he acts like a rm and maximises his level
of consumption C. When his consumption of leisure is between 0 and LF , then his
budget constraint increases. In this case, an added unit of leisure allows the physician to
increase his quantity of consumption C. When his consumption of leisure is between LF
and L, his budget constraint decreases. An added unit of leisure reduces the quantity of
consumption C. To explain this last case, we assume that the physician is an altruistic
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agent, because although it is in his own interest to use his monopolistic power and
reduce his labour supply to increase his level of consumption, he decides against it.
Instead, he prefers to act like an agent who observes a disutility for leisure.
The utility of a physician depends on his decision whether to work at a loss or
not. This choice implies two cases. First, if the physician prefers not to work at a
loss, then he has an utility from leisure and the exponent ' is positive. Second, if the
physician decides to work at a loss, he has a disutility from leisure and the exponent '
is negative. This disutility from leisure may be explained by the altruistic behaviour
adopted voluntarily by the physician, who accepts to work to satisfy the needs of his
patients, although it is not in is his own material interest.
If the exponent ' is positive, then the point of tangency with the indi¤erence curve
is on the decreasing segment of the budget constraint. So, the physician consumes a
quantity of leisure greater than LF :
If the exponent ' is negative, then the point of tangency with the physicians
indi¤erence curve is on the increasing segment of the budget constraint. The physician
consumes between 0 and LF units of leisure.
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The physicians indi¤erence curves are therefore situated either to the right or to
the left of the maximum of the budget constraint, depending on his altruism.
The indi¤erence curve may also be concave and associated with a maximum under
certain mathematical conditions.
The indi¤erence curves are concave when j'j < . If j'j  ; or if ' > 0 and
 > 0; the indi¤erence curves are convex and are associated with an optimum. Concave
indi¤erence curves can also be associated with an optimum under certain mathematical
conditions since the budget constraint is not a¢ ne but concave.
To solve this maximisation problem, we replace labour supply by leisure. The new
hourly net remuneration rate can be written as:
w = f(8640  L) = + (8640  L) + X + u (9)
We introduce this hourly net remuneration rate in the budget constraint that de-
pends on leisure L , other income M; and the price and quantities of consumption
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goods P and C :
[+ (8640  L) + X + u] (8640  L) +M = PC
From this optimisation problem, we can deduce the quantity of leisure that opti-
mises the budget constraint LF ; as:
LF =
+ 2 8640 + X + u
2
We can also deduce the quantity of leisure that optimises physician utility as:
L =
 bpb2   4ac
2a
where:
a =2

'
+ 
b =  
'
  2 8640 
'
  
'
X   
'
u    2 8640   X   u
c =8640+ 86402 + 8640X + 8640u+M
When the physician does not buy any consumption goods, the quantity of leisure
is:
L = 8460 
 
 
p
2   4M
2
!
When the physician does not allocate any time for leisure, but prefers to work, the
quantity of consumption goods is:
C =
8460+ 84602 +M
P
We assume that the quantity of leisure cannot be negative. Thus, we retain only the
solutions for which the quantity of leisure is positive. When the physician maximises
his utility, the ratio between the two exponents of consumption and leisure is given by:

'
=   1
L
 [+ (8640  L) + X + u] (8640  L) +M
(   2 8640 + 2   X   u) (10)
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This ratio enables us to determine the physicians trade-o¤ between leisure and
consumption. If 
'
> 1, then the physician has a preference for the consumption good
C , whereas if 
'
< 1, the physician has a preference for the leisure good L. If 
'
< 0,
the physician has a disutility for leisure.
Preference for leisure or consumption is di¤erent from setting a particular leisure
or income target. Thus, a physician can prefer income over leisure without necessarily
reaching his income objective. This model allows us to consider that a physician can
seek to reach two objectives, leisure and income, and the trade-o¤ between these two
objectives depends on his monopolistic power. Physicians act like a rm that has a
utility function to maximise and two objectives to reach.
Mathematical conditions to nd an optimum
The optimisation problem can be solved using the Lagranger multiplier method:
L = CL' +  [(+ (8640  L) + X + u)(8640  L) +M   PC]
In our model, we assume that the solution to the optimisation problem is a maxi-
mum. Consequently, we assume that the determinant of this matrix is positive:
det
264 ' ('  1)C
L' 2 + 2 'C 1L' 1    2 8640 + 2L
'C 1L' 1  (   1)C 2L'  P
   2 8640 + 2L  P 0
375 > 0
In other words, we assume that:
2

'C 1L' 1

[ P ] [   2 8640 + 2L]
  [   2 8640 + 2L]  (   1)C 2L' [   2 8640 + 2L]
  [ P ] [ P ] ' ('  1)CL' 2 + 2 > 0
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4 Data
4.1 Data base
The estimations are based on a representative sample of 600 physicians practicing in
the PACA region (Provence-Alpes-Côte dAzur), sampled according to age, sex and
urban size. These 600 physicians were contacted by telephone. However, only 321
out of 600 answered all questions. For each physician we have personal information
(sex, age, number of household members), professional information (sector 1, group
practice, secretariat), the quality of their training (number of training sessions, number
of reviews), the characteristics of their patients (percentage of patients that enjoy
universal health insurance cover, percentage of exonerated patients), their professional
environment (medical density) and their practice (number of visits, labour supply).
4.2 Endogeneous variables
The annual labour supply of physicians used in our estimation is the product of the
number of weekly labour hours in liberal practice and the number of labour weeks over
one year. These two variables are constructed from declarations by physicians.
The physicians fees were determined by multiplying the number of yearly con-
sultations and visits recorded by the CNAMTS (caisse nationale dassurance maladie
des travailleurs salariés) and the average price of consultations and home visits in the
municipality where the physicians practice. These prices were estimated using data
provided by URCAM for the months of January and February 2003. These enabled us
to estimate the price-setting practices of physicians in 2002.
The consultation prices in sector 2 and home visit prices in sector 1 and 2 were
determined from an observed average in each municipality. The price of consultations
in sector 1 was 20 euro. The expenses borne by physicians were determined from their
fees and the percentage of expenses in fees which they declared. The hourly net (of
expenses) fees of physicians correspond to the ratio between net fees and their annual
labour supply.
4.3 Physician concentration
We use the Herndahl index Hj to measure the concentration of physician market
shares in each municipality. This index takes account of each physician according to
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the municipality where they practice. The Herndahl index is:
Hj =
X
j2J
s2lj
where slj represents the market shares of each physician in the given municipality.
The concentration of market shares in a municipality increases the Herndahl index.
5 Application
5.1 Description of data
Our sample is composed of 321 physicians, with an average age of 48. 19.6% are female.
Physicianshouseholds are composed of four members on average. Their other sources
of income amount to around 19,000 euro. These physicians have been working in their
practice for an average of 17 years. 52% practice according to a particular exercise
mode (MEP), 83% have signed a work convention with the government (Sector 1),
57% are in a group practice, about 51% have a secretariat and 50% have bought their
practice.
In 2003, average labour supply was around 2,635 hours per annum. The sample
physicians undertook 3,495 consultations and 1,022 visits during that year. However,
it should be noted that these values vary widely across the sample. Home visits on
average accounted for 22% of the hours worked.
Hourly fees are about 37.8 euro, hourly expenses 17.5 euro, and hourly net fees,
20.4 euros on average.
28% of patients are exonerated. Physicians receive an average of eight medical visi-
tors per day, attend an average of 7.5 training sessions organised by the pharmaceutical
industry per year, and an average of 0.47 training sessions organised by a university.
50% of physicians participate in pharmaceutical trials.
45% of our sample physicians practice in Bouches du Rhônes, about 20% inMarseille
and 34% in rural areas.
5.2 Physician preferences according to models
To determine the preference of physicians and the model which is best adapted to
their activity, we take the models developed above and apply them to our sample data.
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We rst present the physician as a salaried price-taker, then the physician as a rm
(price-taker and price-maker), and nally the physician as a price-making agent.
5.2.1 Physician as a price-taker salaried
To determine physician preferences for the consumption or for the leisure good, we
used equation (1).
When physicians are modelled as salaried price-takers, 91% have a preference for
leisure and 9% for consumption. Thus, they have a clear preference for leisure.
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If we assume that physicians are salaried price-takers and if we identify their prefer-
ences, two groups emerge. The rst is composed of physicians who prefer consumption.
This group has high labour supply and low hourly net remuneration rates. The second
is composed of physicians who prefer leisure. This group records low labour supply
and high hourly net remuneration rates.
5.2.2 Physician as a rm
If physicians act like prot-maximising rms, then their marginal benet should equal
their marginal cost. But according to rm models, their marginal benet may be either
greater or less than their marginal cost. We deduce several forms of marginal benet
and marginal cost according to market competition. In e¤ect, the marginal benet
depends on whether physicians act like price-taking rms (hourly fees W , (eq.2) )
or as price-making rms (marginal benet given by (eq.3)). Expenses also depend
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on whether physicians act like price-takers (marginal cost corresponds to taxes) or
price-makers (marginal cost corresponds to (eq.5)).
The elasticity of demand (eq.8) is determined by the marginal benets. Neverthe-
less, this elasticity cannot be interpreted since the marginal cost can be greater than
marginal benet.
We now present the array of possible scenarios.
5.2.3 Physician as a price-taking rm
When we assume that physicians act as price-taking rms, we observe that their hourly
fees are systematically greater than marginal tax rates.
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5.2.4 Physician as a price-making rm
Fixed costs
To determine whether physicians act as price-making rms, and whether they can
a¤ect the price of their labour, we estimated their hourly fees. The results of this
estimation are reported in Table 3.
According to Table 3, labour supply signicantly a¤ects the hourly remuneration
rate. Physicians therefore have monopolistic power in the market. In this case, the
marginal benet is not systematically greater than the marginal cost; in some cases it
may even be negative.
Variable costs
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To determine whether labour supply can a¤ect hourly expenses, we estimate the
impact of labour supply on hourly expenses. The results of this estimation are reported
in Table 4.
We observe that labour supply signicantly reduces hourly expenses. When physi-
cians can reduce the price of expenses, they record a negative marginal cost.
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According to these results, 32% of physicians work even though their marginal cost
is greater than their marginal benet. We can conclude that physicians do not act like
prot-maximising rms.
5.2.5 Physician as a price-making agent
To determine the coe¢ cient of the ratio =' (eq.10), we have estimated the hourly net
remuneration rate w (eq.9) for the entire sample (Table 5).
According to these results, the physicianslabour supply signicantly reduces their
hourly net remuneration rate. Therefore, we can conclude that physicians have mo-
nopolistic power.
From these results, we can compute the ratio =' (eq.10). When we use this ratio to
determine physicianspreferences for consumption or for leisure, 49% of physicians pre-
fer consumption good, 31% leisure good, and 20% experience a disutility from leisure.
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According to these results, 20% of physicians work even though it is not in their
material interest.
They work at a loss to satisfy the needs of their patients. The non-saturation
hypothesis for leisure proposed by classical microeconomics is therefore irrelevant.
When we identify physician preferences as a function of this ratio, three physician
groups emerge. The rst group is composed of physicians who have a preference for
leisure, a low labour supply and high hourly remuneration rate. The second is com-
posed of physicians who have a preference for consumption. This group supplies more
labour than the rst and has a lower remuneration rate. Finally, the third group is
characterised by physicians who experience a disutility from leisure. Labour supply in
this group is the highest and the hourly remuneration rate is the lowest.
6 Discussion
We observe that the hourly remuneration rate is determined partly by the physician
and partly by the market. Our sample physicians working in the PACA region have a
monopolistic power that they can use. Our agent model therefore becomes relevant.
When we compare the results obtained from these di¤erent models, we can observe
that preferences for leisure vary. According to the salaried model, physicians have a
preference for leisure, whereas, according to the agent model, they have a less pro-
nounced preference for leisure and in some cases disutility. Physiciansutility does not
depend solely on leisure and consumption but also on altruism. Indirectly via leisure,
19
physicians assimilate altruism in their utility function.
7 Limitations
The ratio of exponents of the utility function that we use in the di¤erent models to
determine the preference for consumption or leisure must be interpreted with caution.
This ratio only allows us to determine if the physician experiences a disutility from
leisure.
Our agent model does not allow us to determine substitution or income e¤ects.
These two e¤ects are determined by variations in prices, which are endogenous in our
setting. To determine the strategic behaviour adopted by agents after a change to their
monopolistic power is di¢ cult to evaluate. This would require further extensions of
the model.
We have used an aggregated market (all physicians) to estimate the breakdown of
the hourly remuneration rate, the hourly net remuneration rate and the hourly rate
of expenses, whereas the optimisation problem of a physician is individual. While we
are aware that the estimations are not perfect, the fact that they are based on an
aggregated market allows us to observe the average impact of labour supply on these
di¤erent rates.
8 Econometric application
8.1 Model
We apply a probit model to estimate the determinants of leisure disutility. The results
are reported in Table 6.
8.2 Determinants of leisure disutility
According to these results, physicians who practice in municipalities where the market
share is highly concentrated are more likely to observe a leisure disutility. Physicians
who practice in a municipality with high medical density are more likely to observe a
leisure disutility.
Two explanations can be advanced. First, physicians can adopt altruistic behaviour.
Second, physicians can adopt strategic behaviour to maintain their market share. In
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the case of altruistic physicians, a concentrated market can lead to health needs which
cannot be satised. This is the reason why some physicians supply labour in these
areas even though it is not in their material interest. On the other hand, physicians
may exhibit what appear like a disutility from leisure because they adopt strategic
behaviour. Competition in a market can lead to apparent disutility from leisure. To
attract patients, physicians may take more time to satisfy patients.
9 Conclusion
According to our estimations, increased labour supply signicantly reduces the remu-
neration rate of physicians. Consequently, they have monopolistic power that they may
or may not choose to exercise. Our agent model can explain the activity of physicians
in France. According to our estimations, 20% of physicians experience disutility from
leisure. This disutility can be explained by the physiciansaltruism aimed at serving
the needs of their patients.
The agent model has some limits. In e¤ect, we determine the impact of labour
supply from an aggregated market, but this can vary as a function of the sample size.
Therefore, the results may well according to the sample under investigation.
Disutility from leisure could explain the strategic behaviours adopted by physicians
but also a lack of care provision in some areas. This disutility raises the question of
the appropriateness of surgery location choices for the needs of patients.
The agent model that we propose could be applied to lawyers, to liberal professions,
to craft professions, or to any other individual who maximises his utility subject to a
budget constraint that is shaped to some extent by the presence of monopolistic power.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
GPsactivity
Labour supply 2635.407 638.367
Number of visit 3495.334 1520.577
Number of home visit 1022.129 761.401
Fees 97805.512 40963.404
Hourly fees 37.876 15.624
Expenses 45162.862 22147.383
Hourly expenses 17.472 8.521
Net fees 52642.65 24734.038
Hourly net fees 20.404 9.44
Marginal benet (GPs price-maker) 20.527 16.982
Marginal cost (GPs price-maker) 17.307 12.679
Part of home visit 0.221 0.122
Physiciansclientele
Part of exonerated patients 28.444 11.545
Part of patients 0-16 18.8 6.383
Part of patients 17-58 55.605 7.157
Part of of patients 59-69 9.184 2.97
Part of patients 70 + 14.796 7.601
GPscharacteristics
Woman 0.196
Age 48.215 5.823
Household size 3.845 1.422
Others income 18748.862 31058.528
GPspractice characteristics
Age of installation 17.379 7.693
Exercise of MEP 0.524
Sector 1 0.830
Exercise in group 0.571
Secretaire 0.511
Practice purchase 0.498
Nb of pharmaceutical prospector 8.24 5.154
Therapeutical trial 0.521
Pharmaceutical laboratories formation hours 7.543 10.875
University formation hours 0.47 3.454
N 317
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
GPsdepartment
Alpes de Hautes Provence 0.028
Hautes Alpes 0.044
Alpes Maritimes 0.192
Bouches du Rhône 0.451
Var 0.174
Vaucluse 0.11
Marseille 0.199
Rural area 0.344
GPsCompetition environment
GPs density 147.684 57.289
Specialist physician density 161.699 134.205
Herndhal index 0.112 0.202
N 317
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Table 3: Hourly fees
Variable Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.)
GPscharacteristics
Age -0.439 (0.181)
Woman -11.555 (1.956)
Others income 0.000 (0.000)
GPspractice characteristics
Age of installation 0.319 (0.137)
Sector 1 -4.518 (2.054)
Secretaire 6.156 (1.476)
Pharmaceutical laboratories formation hours 0.115y (0.067)
Therapeutical trial 4.215 (1.511)
GPsactivity
Labour supply -0.007 (0.001)
Physiciansclientele
Part of exonerated patients 0.292 (0.068)
Part of patients 0-16 0.696 (0.168)
Part of of patients 59-69 0.514 (0.326)
Part of patients 70 -0.322 (0.143)
GPsdepartment
Alpes de Hautes Provence -3.941 (4.430)
Hautes Alpes 0.237 (3.714)
Alpes Maritimes 4.528 (2.156)
Var 7.187 (2.162)
Vaucluse 1.723 (2.557)
Intercept 46.207 (9.637)
N 317
R2 0.398
F (18;298) 10.942
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
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Table 4: Hourly expenses
Variable Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.)
GPscharacteristics
Woman -3.992 (1.124)
GPspractice characteristics
Sector 1 -4.477 (1.206)
Practice purchase 1.533y (0.865)
Secretaire 4.160 (0.876)
GPsactivity
Labour supply -0.003 (0.001)
Physiciansclientele
Part of exonerated patients 0.106 (0.040)
Part of patients 0-16 0.293 (0.098)
Part of of patients 59-69 0.363y (0.188)
Part of patients 70 + -0.229 (0.084)
GPsdepartment
Alpes de Hautes Provence -3.141 (2.630)
Hautes Alpes -1.230 (2.217)
Alpes Maritimes 2.523 (1.274)
Var 2.888 (1.265)
Vaucluse 0.109 (1.496)
Intercept 16.794 (3.573)
N 317
R2 0.271
F (14;302) 8.021
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
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Table 5: Hourly net remuneration rate
Variable Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.)
GPscharacteristics
Woman -7.372 (0.998)
GPspractice characteristics
Secretaire 2.125 (0.760)
Pharmaceutical laboratories formation hours 0.085 (0.035)
Pharmaceutical trial 1.913 (0.783)
GPsactivity
Labour supply -0.004 (0.001)
Physiciansclientele
Part of exonerated patients 0.118 (0.033)
Part of patients 0-16 0.446 (0.082)
Part of of patients 59-69 0.248 (0.161)
Part of patients 70 + -0.022 (0.070)
Intercept 14.336 (3.134)
N 317
R2 0.339
F (9;307) 17.517
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
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Table 6: Disutility of leisure
Variable Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.)
GPscharacteristics
Household size -0.253 (0.072)
GPspractice characteristics
Age of installation -0.042 (0.013)
Exercise in group -0.488 (0.207)
Secretaire -0.349y (0.209)
Exercise of MEP 0.486 (0.198)
Physiciansclientele
Part of patients 0-16 -0.056 (0.024)
Part of of patients 59-69 0.048 (0.041)
Part of patients 70 + -0.002 (0.017)
GPsdepartment
Alpes de Hautes Provence -0.441 (0.528)
Hautes Alpes -0.482 (0.502)
Alpes Maritimes -0.199 (0.254)
Var -1.254 (0.364)
Vaucluse -0.060 (0.342)
GPsCompetition environment
GPs density 0.003y (0.002)
Herndhal index 1.587 (0.503)
Intercept 1.451 (0.928)
N 317
Log-likelihood -118.57
2(15) 76.195
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
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